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POPULAR WORDS IN LAW LEXICONS. II.
The non-technical common words which should have a place in
a law dictionary are of two classes. First, combinations, of which
the following are familiar examples: acknowledgement "separate
and apart" from the husband; devise to a wife's "sole and separate
use"; "instrument for the payment of money"; "under and sub-
ject to" a mortgage in a deed of conveyance; and, perhaps, "grant,
bargain, and sell," as importing covenants. These and similar ex-
pressions pass unchallenged as technically legal or quasi-legal.
The other class consists of single words which have been con-
strued by the courts. Illustrations are numerous. Who is a
"laborer," a "mechanic," an "employee"; what is an "imple-
ment," a "tool of trade," a "machine," within the meaning of
particular exemption and lien laws, has been passed upon by
different courts. Decisions upon these and many other popular
words, the meanings of which were directly drawn in question,
become valuable as precedents.
All courts agree that the ordinary sense of any word, technical
or untechnical, is to be adhered to, unless that would lead to an
absurdity or to repugnancy to the rest of the instrument; in which
cases that sense may be modified so as to avoid such result, pro tanto.
There is no room for construing an instrument when (a) it con.
tains no word peculiar to a calling; (b) is expressed in unambigu-
ous language; (c) the circumstances attending execution are not
disputed; (d) fraud, accident, or mistake is not alleged. In any
such case the parties will be held to the plain meaning of all the
words. And only when a material fact is in dispute, will the con-
tention be referred to a jury.
The rule then being (i) that a word of art (trade, profession,
etc.) is presumed to have its ordinary technical sense, whatever
the nature of the document, and will be so applied unless the con-
text or the instrument as a whole, evinces a different meaning;
and (2) that a non-technical word will be given its usual popular
sense, unless enlarged or restrained by associated words, the entire
writing or circumstances,-consideration by a court of the mean-
ing of a popular word rarely has reference to its accepted defini-
tion, nearly always to the claim that a particular person or object
was or was not intended to be included within the description,
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enumeration, or other designation. It is understood that a famil-
iar word of itself has no legal meaning. Judges sometimes quote
vernacular dictionaries, but in an ancillary way; never as imply-
ing that those books furnish legal definitions. The popular and
the legal meaning of a common word are one. That is to say,
common words have no distinctively legal meaning. To announce
in a law dictionary that "in American jurisprudence, tick is a col-
loquial expression for credit or trust"; "log, a portion of a [?]
trunk of a tree"; "root, the underground portion of a tree or
plant"; "fodder, food for horses or cattle," is not to assert an un-
truth, except in so far as the implication is that these are the mean-
ings peculiar to law, rather than the meanings in the country
paper, in the store, the field, the backwoods.
The question is one of construction: Has the word, from its
collocation, a sense inclusive or exclusive of a particular person,
thing, or class? To answer this is to find out, by settled legal ex-
egetical rules, what the contracting parties, the testator, or the
law-maker, as the case may be, intended by the phraseology.
Whatever is within the intention is as really within a statute, for
instance, as if within the letter (language), and, though not speci-
fied, will be included. A thing within the letter is not within the
purview if contrary to the spirit. What is clearly implied is a
part, as if expressed.
A large number of modern cases record the judicial construc-
tion of popular words and phrases, employed in instances, in senses
more or less unusual or irregular, in bonds, conveyances, leases;
in mining, building, construction, farming, partnership, naviga-
tion, transportation, employment, and other contracts; in wills,
pleadings, instructions, findings, awards, repprts; in ordinances
and statutes; even in judicial opinions and decrees, court records,
proclamations, constitutions, and treaties-in every sort of docu-
ment, public and private.
Inasmuch as points decided in one jurisdiction may arise in
others, such interpretations of familiar words and phrases are
scarcely less valuable than the delimitation of rules and the enun-
ciation of principles.
.The more important of these decisions will be painstakingly
presented in any law dictionary deserving the name, along with suf-
ficient of the context to show the precise ground of contention, the
names of parties, year of decision, where reported, annotated, etc.
A law work without authorities is an anomaly.
The insertion of adjudged common words does not, however,
authorize the insertion of unconstrued expressions by way of antic-
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ipation of future rulings. Anticipation here, to be useful, must
amount to prescience-a knowledge of the intention of, or the
meaning of language to be used by, a person or persons to act in
the future, perhaps as yet unborn. Hitherto, prescience in the
mind of the dictionary maker has coexisted, it would seem, with
business foresight, the foresight of the tradesman.
A judge, required to interpret a common phrase, would not
think of consulting a law dictionary for definitions of words in
everybody's mouth. He is as competent as any, and assuredly,
more competent than some law writers, to state, when needful,
the meanings accorded to words in popular speech. He might be
aided by references to cases in which similar claims were settled.
To ascertain whether an expression, susceptible of different mean-
ings, has been passed upon, he would likely turn to a good law
dictionary for a digest of cases; but it is not to be believed that
in all this broad land, there has been elevated to a bench, above
the level of the seat of a cobbler lately commissioned a justice of
the peace, a man so grossly ignorant as not to know the meaning of
the hearth-and-home " I terms" found in stock-in-trade law lexicons,
specimens of which were given in a former paper; and, further,
not comprehending them, that he would seek out a law lexicon for
enlightenment, rather than a common school dictionary. And the
same may be said in behalf of all practicing lawyers, and of all
law students.
If the makers of legal vocabularies, instead of confining them-
selves to legal subjects, prefer to draw material from the limitless
field of vernacular expression, in which each may cull according
to his whim, unrestrained by dread of effective competition, ex-
cept as to possible size of production, why be content, unless for
purposes of ease, with rehabilitating the most common of common
words, ancient and modern? words, for instance, descriptive of
the familiar objects the author chances to note, as, for relief from
the labor of perusing scissors-and-paste-made copy, his eye wanders
from articles of office equipment to the street, with its pedestrians,
quadrupeds and vehicles; thence to houses and hills beyond: fea-
tures of which common things are afterward found to have left
their impress on the law dictionary then in gestation!
Why not scan modern reports for words, which, while not legal
in any sense, are yet not very common, with which decisions
abound, and which a few students may not understand? Thou-
sands of these could be "run in" as "quasi-legal," like the other
thousands no more worthy.
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Why not define semaphore, vacuum, dummy motor (5o Kan.
455); shunting cars (97 Mich. 318); arable land (91 Pa. 438); table-
land (79 Iowa 621); sag-hole (64 Mich. 42; 97 id. 283); prairie-dog
hole (42 Kan. 47); Bohemian oats (79 Iowa, 56o; 84 Mich. 357)?
Why omit scaler, scale-sheet (86 Mich. 36); annular, clasp-
engagement, counter-shank, disked, hemispheroidal (i5o U. S.
iii); alternating, amplitude, electrode, periodicity, polarity, pul-
satory, sinusoidal (126 U. S. 1-584)?
Why discard incongruous (io8 Pa. 604); latitudinarian (44 La.
Ann. 946; I58 Mass. 58); procrustean (87 Ky. 262; 84 Me. 407);
prolix (93 Mich. 509); connote (54 N. J. L. 28); equipollent (55
N. J. L. 103); rationale (49 N. J. E. 38; 54 N. J. L. 232); resume
(102 Mo. 69); charivari (78 Iowa, 292); melee (io6 Mo. 38)?
Why ignore clavicle, scapula (45 Kan. 653); femur (81 Mich.
637); coma (78 Iowa, 593); vermiculation (io6 Mo. 361); jocko,
simian, monkey-wrench?
Finding these expressions in law books does not, of course, in-
vest them with a legal character, any more than finding in the
year books, in ancient rolls and charters, and in forgotten tracts,
popular words once heard in localities, but for centuries obsolete,
invests such words with the character of law terms and entitles
them to entry in law dictionaries. Nevertheless, accurate expla-
nation in a law dictionary of such modern, much-used words as
those last given, would likely gratify more uncritical persons than
are accommodated by the present practice of reproducing indiscrim-
inately familiar non-technical "terms," like driver, porter, yard,
garden, window, door, key, air, grain, root, compost, etc., etc.
In the one case just as easily and as disingenuously as in the other,
Bombastes could direct his typewriter coiditress to prefix the
stereotyped formula: "In American juristic relations, the univer-
sally recognized signification of this all-important substantive ex-
pression is, it imports" so and so. Thus, with the unread young
man, one word as readily as another may be passed off as a techni-
cal legal term, and his favorite law dictionary and lexicon in its
successive revisions, be enlarged ad infinium-ad nauseam.
Of the making of books on the easy plan of the law glossary-
mongers, there certainly is no end. Where there is no "fence,"
there can be no over-the-fence, and hence, no "outs."
William C. Anderson.
